What you need to know
During the night of January 2, 2026, U.S. Special Forces captured Venezuelan President Nicholas Maduro and his wife Cilia Adela Flores from a military base in Venezuela. They were flown to New York City and indicted for narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine. This brief addresses important questions on this operation, including:
- The stated rationale.
- Was the operation a typical use of U.S. military force?
- Was the operation legal under U.S. Law, the Constitution, and international law?
- What might happen next?
What is the rationale?
Trump Administration officials have given five broad rationales for the operation against Maduro:
- It is believed that Maduro is a corrupt leader who was elected in a fraudulent election.
- Criminal organizations in Venezuela are producing and shipping illegal drugs such as fentanyl and cocaine to the U.S., with Maduro allegedly either involved or giving implicit approval. In 2020, the U.S. Department of State’s international drug control report estimated that about 200 – 250 metric tons of cocaine were either produced or trafficked through Venezuela to the U.S. annually.
- During Maduro’s administration, a refugee crisis has unfolded with up to 8 million people having reportedly already left Venezuela over the last decade (about a quarter of the total population). Sources estimate more than 600,000 Venezuelans have entered the U.S. under Temporary Protected Status (TPS) as of early 2025. (see our brief here for more info).
- Venezuela has been under U.S. oil sanctions since 2019, which target exports of crude and refined products to U.S. and Western buyers. Despite these restrictions, Venezuela continues to export oil to Asia, with China as a predominant buyer. Chinese and Russian companies are also involved in Venezuelan oil production. Increased American access to Venezuela could displace these companies. If efforts to increase Venezuelan oil production are successful, global oil prices will decline. A decline would hurt the Russian economy, which relies on oil as its main export, but might help the American economy due to lower energy costs.
- A successful operation in Venezuela could prompt other governments in the region (including Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico) to adjust their policies to align more closely with the current U.S. administration’s priorities.
Many experts agree with these key points. All reputable international organizations regard Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election as illegitimate. Popular opposition candidates were prohibited from running; election authorities declared Maduro the winner while votes were still being counted; and official vote totals were never released. The poor state of the Venezuelan economy and the refugee crisis are well-documented. However, the 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment mentions Venezuela only on one page of a 73-page report, identifying China and Mexico as major sources of illegal drugs imported into the U.S.. One explanation could be that the assessment focused primarily on major sources of fentanyl and synthetic drugs, however, if this is the case, does that suggest the primary reason of Maduro’s capture was less about illegal drugs entering the U.S. from Venezuela and more about oil dominance or some other reason?
Although the actual size of Venezuela’s oil reserves is uncertain, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) suggests Venezuela had about 303 billion barrels of proven oil reserves as of 2023. Increasing production for the benefit of the U.S. and its allies will probably be costly and take years. Given that these estimates represent 17% of global reserves, could they indicate a greater desire for direct influence over Venezuela?
How unusual are these actions?
The Venezuela operation is consistent with the Monroe Doctrine, first stated by President James Monroe in 1823, which is a foundational U.S. foreign policy principle that set the framework for how the U.S. relates to Europe and the Western Hemisphere, seeking a dominant position. The U.S. has frequently used military force in Central America and the Caribbean to put down rebellions, change governments, and protect citizens and commercial interests. Examples include the occupation of Haiti and Nicaragua in the early 20th century, the 1916 invasion of Mexico to capture the guerrilla leader Pancho Villa, CIA funding and support for a 1962 rebel invasion of Cuba, the 1982 invasion of Grenada to reverse a military coup, and the 1989 invasion of Panama to arrest President Manuel Noriega on drug-trafficking charges.
Was the operation legal under U.S. Laws and the Constitution?
The Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief, meaning the President has the authority to order U.S. forces into combat. However, Presidents generally inform congressional leaders of pending operations. Lawmakers from both parties say they were not briefed before the U.S. launched the operations that led to the capture of Maduro and his wife, so this common practice was not followed in the case of the Venezuelan operation.
The President’s ability to conduct military operations is limited under the War Powers Act. The president is required to report to Congress when U.S. forces are sent into hostilities. The use of force must be terminated within 60 days unless Congress approves. The President is required, whenever possible, to consult with Congress before the start of hostilities. However, in this case, American military operations culminated in Maduro’s capture, so the President is not required to notify Congress.
Members of Congress could stop future Venezuelan deployments by passing a resolution prohibiting the expenditure of funds on such operations. However, given Republican majorities in the House and Senate and the potential for a presidential veto, such a resolution is unlikely to be enacted.
What about international law?
While there is no enforceable code of international law, there have historically been norms of conduct that nations are expected to follow. One of these central norms is sovereignty, meaning that nations should not interfere with activities in another nation. Clearly, arresting a nation’s leader and bringing him to trial in another nation contradicts this norm.
A consideration for the U.S. is not whether the United Nations or another actor will bring legal proceedings against the country. Rather, breaking the norm of sovereignty in Venezuela will likely make it more difficult for the U.S. to build international coalitions against other norm violators, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or China’s potential takeover of Taiwan.
What happens next?
By capturing President Maduro, the U.S. has accomplished the easiest of its stated goals. The U.S. is the world’s strongest military power, and there is a very unlikely chance of retaliation by Venezuela or any other country. However, reviving the Venezuelan economy, increasing the country’s oil exports to the U.S., or persuading refugees to return home could require U.S. economic assistance or the introduction of U.S. military forces. These operations are likely to be costly, put U.S. lives at risk, and may not succeed.
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Further reading
Weed, M. 2025. Understanding the War Powers Resolution. Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13134, accessed 1/5/26.
Roy, D. & Cheatham, A. 2024. Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis, July 31, 2024, accessed 1/5/26.
Sources
Ortiz, A., Ziegler, H., & Zhuang, Y. 2026. What We Know About Maduro’s Capture and the Fallout. The New York Times. January 3, 2026, https://tinyurl.com/3kexdpsx, accessed 1/5/26
Plagakis, S., & Torreon, B. 2023. Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2023. Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42738, accessed 1/5/26.
Weed, M. 2025. Understanding the War Powers Resolution. Congressional Research Service. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF13134, accessed 1/5/26.
Slagter, T. H., & Van Doorn, J. D. (2022). Fundamental perspectives on international law. Cambridge University Press.
Roy, D. & Cheatham, A. 2024. Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis, July 31, 2024, accessed 1/5/26.
Gilderhus, M. T. (2006). The Monroe doctrine: meanings and implications. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36(1), 5-16.
Weitzman, A., & Huss, K. (2024). The Venezuelan humanitarian crisis, out-migration, and household change among Venezuelans in Venezuela and abroad. Demography, 61(3), 737-767.
Drug Enforcement Agency. 2025. National Drug Threat Assessment. https://tinyurl.com/rdwduejv, accessed 1/4/26.
Bloomberg News. 2025. Chinese, Russian Claims on Venezuela Oil Seen as Tenuous After U.S. Intervention. https://tinyurl.com/3n468fvf, accessed 1/6/25.
Aray, H., & Vera, D. (2024). A tale of oil production collapse. Resources Policy, 93, 105044.
Contributors
William Bianco (Research Director) is Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Founding Director of the Indiana Political Analytics Workshop. He received his PhD from the University of Rochester. His teaching focuses on first-year students and the Introduction to American Government class, emphasizing quantitative literacy. He is the co-author of American Politics Today, an introductory textbook published by W. W. Norton, now in its 8th edition, and authored a second textbook, American Politics: Strategy and Choice. His research program is on American politics, including Trust: Representatives and Constituents, and numerous articles. He was also the PI or Co-PI for seven National Science Foundation grants and a current grant from the Russell Sage Foundation on the sources of inequalities in federal COVID assistance programs. His op-eds have been published in The Washington Post, Indianapolis Star, Newsday, and other venues.




